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United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973)
United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 9 (1973)
In two companion cases, United States v. Dio-
nisio' and United States v. Mara,2 the Supreme
Court held that a grand jury subpoena to testify
is not a seizure within the meaning of the fourth
amendment. Additionally, the Court determined
that the fourth amendment does not require the
government to make a preliminary showing of
reasonableness before a grand jury can compel a
witness validly subpoenaed to produce physical
evidence such as handwriting or voice exemplars.
Dionisio arose when the respondent and ap-
proximately nineteen others were subpoenaed by a
special grand jury for the Northern District of
Illinois which was investigating illegal interstate
gambling operations. Durings its investigation
the grand jury had received voice recording ex-
hibits from authorized wiretaps.3 Dionisio refused
to comply with the grand jury's request for com-
parison voice exemplars, asserting both fourth
and fifth amendment claims. The government
obtained a district court order demanding com-
pliance. 4 Dionisio again refused to comply and was
held in civil contempt. 5
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
reversed, holding that the fourth amendment
applied to grand jury requests for physical evi-
dence and that a witness may not be forced to
comply without a showing of reasonableness of
the grand jury's request.'
Mara arose from a grand jury investigation in
the Northern District of Illinois of thefts from
interstate shipments of goods. Mara was sub-
poenaed and requested to submit handwriting
exemplars to the grand jury. He refused. The
government then petitioned the district court to
1410 U.S. 1 (1973).
2410 U.S. 9 (1973).
3 See 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (1971).
1410 U.S. at 3. The district court opinions and orders
in both Dionisio and Mara are unreported.5 This adjudication of contempt was made pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) (1971), which provides:
Whenever a witness in any proceeding before or
ancillary to any court or grand jury of the United
States refuses without just cause to comply with an
order of the court to testify..., the court upon
such refusal may summarily order his confine-
ment ... until such time as the witness is willing
to give such testimony.
410 U.S. at 4 (emphasis added).6 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
compel Mara's compliance, indicating that the
exemplars were "essential and necessary" to the
grand jury's investigation.7
After an in camera proceeding, the district
court rejected Mara's contention that the grand
jury's request constituted an unreasonable search
and seizure and ordered him to comply. When
Mara continued to refuse, he also was adjtidged to
be in civil contempt. The Seventh Circuit again
reversed," holding that its opinion in" Dionisio
required a showing of reasonableness which must
be tested in an adversary proceeding. Further,
the court held that the government must make a
substantive showing:
(tihat the grand jury investigation was properly
authorized, for a purpose Congress can order, that
the information sought is relevant to the inquiry,
and that ... the grand jury process is not being
abused .... [Tihe Government's affidavit must
also show why satisfactory handwriting and
printing exemplars cannot be obtained from other
sources without grand jury compulsion. 9
Justice Stewart, writing for the Court in both
Dionisio and Mara, rejected the Seventh Circuit's
fourth amendment analysis.I8 He argued that the
7 454 F.2d 580, 582 (7th Cir. 1971).5 Id. at 584.9 Id. at 584-85. The reasonableness standard the
Seventh Circuit demanded required a showing of less
than the probable cause standard for an arrest. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10 Both the Seventh Circuit and the Supreme Court
rejected Dionisio's fifth amendment claims, relying on
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967),.and Gil-
bert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), in which the
Court held that the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination does not reach handwriting exemplars
or voice samples taken for their physical characteristics
instead of communicative content. The Wade-Gilbert
rule was derived from Schmerber v. California, 384
U.S. 757 (1966), and Holt v. United States, 218 U.S.
245 (1910). In Schrnerber, the Court held that a blood
sample could be withdrawn from a defendant for analy-
sis of its alcoholic content without violating the fifth
amendment privilege against self-incrimination. In
Holt the Court said that compelling a defendant to
put on a blouse for identification purposes also did not
violate this privilege. Justice Holmes, writing for the
Court in Holt, stated:
[Tihe prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal
court to be a witness against himself is a prohibi-
tion of the use of physical or moral compulsion to
exhort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.
218 U.S. at 252-53.
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constitutionality of compulsory production of
exemplars is measured by a two-step test: first,
whether the initial compulsion of the witness to
appear before the grand jury was valid; and sec-
ond, whether the subsequent demand to produce
physical evidence by itself was an unreasonable
search within the meaning of the fourth amend-
ment.n
Relying heavily on Branzburg v. Hayes" and
Kastigar v. United States," Stewart stated that
In Wade the Court interpreted Holt as limiting
"exhorting communications" to testimony. Schmerber
states that the fifth amendment privilege generally
"offers no protection against compulsion to submit to
fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to
write or speak for identification, to appear in court, to
stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a par-
ticular gesture." 384 U.S. at 764 (emphasis added). In
the instant case, the Court concluded that Dionisio's
fifth amendment claim was clearly controlled by the
above line of cases.
"Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), and
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), articulated the fourth
amendment standard that "wherever an individual may
harbor a reasonable 'expectation of privacy'... he is
entitled to be free from unreasonable governmental
intrusion." 392 U.S. at 9. The reasonable expectation
of privacy in seizing physical evidence occurs at two
levels-at the time the person is restrained by the
government and at the time the evidence itself is
"seized." See Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Schmer-
her v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
12408 U.S. 665 (1972). In Branzburg the Court held
that the first amendment does not provide a newsperson
with a constitutional privilege to withhold relevant
facts from a grand jury to protect his or her news
sources. A foundation of the Court's opinion in that
case was the need for wide investigatory powers for
grand juries. Justice White, writing for the majority,
stated:
The role of the grand jury as an important instru-
ment of effective law enforcement necessarily in-
cludes an investigatory function with respect to
determining whether a crime has been committed
and who committed it. To this end it must call
witnesses, in the manner best suited to perform its
task. "When the grand jury is performing its in-
vestigatory function into a general problem area
.. society's interest is best served by a thorough
and extensive investigation." Wood v. Georgia, 370
U.S. 375, 392 (1962). A grand jury investigation
"is not fully carried out until every available clue
has been run down and all witnesses examined in
every proper way to find if a crime has been com-
mitted." United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138, 140(2d Cir. 1970). 408 U.S. at 701. Such an investiga-
tion may be triggered by tips, rumors, evidence
proffered by the prosecutor, or the personal knowl-
edge of the grand jurors. Costello v. United States,
350 U.S. at 362.
See also United States v. Stone, 429 F.2d 138 (2d
Cir. 1970); Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
1:406 U.S. 441 (1972). In Kastigar the Court held
that giving transactional immunity is not required to
compel a witness to testify before a grand jury over a
claim of fifth amendment privilege once use and deriva-
tive use immunity are given. The Court thus affirmed
the power of the government to compel testimony
there is an "historically grounded obligation of
every person to appear and give his evidence
before the grand jury." 14 The Court recognized
that there are limits on the investigatory powers
of a grand jury and that grand juries are subject
to judicial control. The fifth amendment protects
a grand jury witness from being required to testify
against himself or produce private books or rec-
ords which could be self-incriminating. 15 Similarly,
the fourth amendment protects against a grand
jury subpoena duces tecum which is overbroad in
its terms and hence unreasonable.16 General con-
cepts of due process may also limit a grand jury
when it can be shown that the purpose of the
inquiry is official harassment. 7
Justice Stewart stated that proof of harassment
was impossible in Dionisio, even though twenty
witnesses were summoned to give voice exemplars:
The grand jury may well find it desirable to call
numerous witnesses in the course of an investiga-
tion. It does not follow that each witness may resist
a subpoena on the ground that too many witnesses
have been called. Neither the order to Dionisio to
appear, nor the order to make a voice recording,
was rendered unreasonable by the fact that many
others were subjected to the same compulsion.$
Justice Stewart argued that the grand jury must
have broad investigatory powers to fulfill its
historical task as an independent investigative 9
body interposed between the accused and the
prosecutor.2 The jury must be able to act on tips,
rumors, and evidence offered by the prosecutor or
on its own personal knowledge.
before the grand jury once the privilege against self-
incrimination is effectively protected.
4 410 U.S. at 9-10.
Is See, e.g., Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479(1951); Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950);
Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
2
6 Silverthome Lumber Co. v. United States, 251
U.S. 385 (1920); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
See also Boyd v. Bell, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
17 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709-10 (1972)(Powell, J., concurring). Powell's argument is intended
to reach the problems raised by n. 19 infra.
Is 410 U.S. at 13.
19 The grand jury has been historically both an
investigatory as well asan accusatory body. See Dession
& Cohen, The Inquisitorial Functions of the Grand
Jurors, 41 YA L.J. 687 (1932); Comment, The Grand
Jury as an Investigatory Body, 74 HAnv. L. Rnv. 590(1961); Comment, The Grand Jury-Its Investigatory
Powers and Limitations, 37 Mnmr. L. REv. 586 (1953).
20 In recent years both professional and popularjournals have questioned the reality of the theory that
the grand jury is an independent body without political
or social bias. See, e.g., Antel, The Modern Grand
Jury: Benighted Supergovernment, 51 A.B.A.J. 153
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The Court concluded that since there is an
historically grounded obligation to appear before
a grand jury and since grand juries should have
wide ranging investigatory powers, a "subpoena
to appear before a grand jury is not a 'seizure' in
the Fourth Amendment sense, even though that
summons may be inconvenient or burdensome." 21
Thus a grand jury subpoena to testify is not the
kind of governmental invasion of privacy protected
by the fourth amendment. Applying this reasoning,
the Court found that a testimonial appearance
before a grand jury is compulsory even without a
preliminary showing of reasonableness.
Justice Stewart also found that the subsequent
demand to produce handwriting or voice exemplars
was reasonable. He began his analysis by stating
that the fourth amendment only protects against
interferences with reasonable expectations of
privacy.22 Since a person reveals his voice or writ-
ing daily, he has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in the physical characteristics of his voice
or writing; consequently, the demand for the
exemplar does not violate the fourth amendment
unless the individual is illegally detained.
On these grounds the Court distinguished Davis
(1965); Donner & Cerutti, The Grand Jury Network:
How The Nixon Administration Has Secretly Perverted
a Traditional Safeguard of Individual Rights, 214 TE
NATION 5 (1972); Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic
Role of the Grand Jury, 10 AMER. Came. L. REv. 701(1972). The experience with grand juries in "political"
cases has been particularly troublesome. See Hammond
v. Brown, 323 F. Supp. 326 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (grandjury investigating the Kent State incident overstepped
powers in its final report). As Chief Judge William
Campbell of the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois has stated, the grand jury:
[H]as long ceased to be the guardian of the people
for which purpose it was created .... Today it is but
a convenient tool for the prosecutor-too often used
solely for publicity. Any experienced prosecutor
will admit that he can indict anybody at any time
for almost anything before any grand jury.
55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972). He believes that the insti-
tution has "outlived its usefulness and has degenerated
into nothing but a convenient shield for the prosecutor."
Campbell, Eliminate the Grand Jury, 64 J. Cans. L. & C.
174, 182 (1973).
Judge Campbell was involved in one recent tu-
multuous encounter between a grand jury and political
dissidents-the "Chicago 8 conspiracy" case. See J.
EpsTINu, THE GREAT CONSPIRAcY TRIAL (1970); R.
HARnus, JusTicz (1970). See also Schwartz, Demytholo-
gizing the Grand Jury, 10 AmER. Cans. L. Rv. 701,
752-754 (1972). For an exposition of the theory that
the grand jury serves as an impartial buffer between
accused and accusor in political cases, see Ex Parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887).
21410 U.S. at 9.
22 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
v. Mississippi,N the primary case relied on by the
Seventh Circuit in Dionisio. In Davis, the Court
held that it was impermissible to admit finger-
prints obtained while the defendant was being
illegally detained without probable cause as one
of twenty suspects arrested in a wholesale roundup.
The Seventh Circuit in Dionisio stated that "the
dragnet effect here.., has the same invidious
effect on fourth amendment rights as the practice
condemned in Davis." 2 Justice Stewart took a
different view of Davis. He argued that the finger-
printing itself, not the unconstitutional method of
detention, was attacked. Since it was not uncon-
stitutional to require Dionisio to appear before the
grand jury, Davis was inapplicable.
The Court also distinguished Davis on the
grounds that the compulsion exerted on the in-
dividual by a grand jury subpoena differs from
that exerted by an arrest or an investigative stop.
Quoting United States v. Doe (Schwartz)2 5 the
Court maintained that:
The latter is abrupt, is effected with force or the
threat of it and often in demeaning circumstances,
and, in the case of arrest, results in a record in-
volving social stigma. A subpoena is'served in the
same manner as other legal process; it involves no
stigma whatever; if the time for appearance is in-
convenient, this can generally be altered; and it
reamins at all times under the control and super-
vision of a court.26
Because the Court found Davis inapplicable,
and because neither Dionisio nor Mara had an
expectation of privacy in the requested physical
evidence, the Court concluded that once a witness
is before the grand jury, the grand jury can obtain
voice or handwriting exemplars without a pre-
liminary showing of reasonableness.
Justice Douglas and Justice Marshall each wrote
an opinion dissenting from the Court's fourth and
fifth amendment holdings.n Justice Brennan con-
- 394 U.S. 721 (1969). Davis was one of forty Negro
youths detained and interrogated immediately after the
rape of a white woman. Ten days later, Davis wasjailed without a warrant and fingerprinted. Davis
claimed that these prints were obtained in violation of
the fourth and fifth amendments.24 
Tn re Dionisio, 442 F.2d 276 (7th Cir. 1971).
25 457 F.2d 895 (2d Cir. 1972). The Supreme Court's
opinion in the instant cases closely follows the Second
Circuit's approach in Doe(Schwartz). The majority
opinion in Dionisio and Mara adopts the Second
Circuit's two step expectation of privacy test and its
analysis of the type of stigma attendant in a grand jury
subpoena.26 Id. at 898.
17 Justice Douglas adhered to his dissents in United
[Vol. 64
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curred with the majority's fifth amendment analy-
sis while dissenting with Justice Marshall on fourth
amendment grounds.22
Both justice Marshall and justice Douglas
asserted that the Court's construction of the his-
torically grounded obligation to appear before the
grand jury was too broadly drawn when it included
an obligation to produce physical evidence as well
as oral or documentary testimonial evidence. 29
Marshall and Douglas believed that the duty to
appear before the grand jury was limited to pro-
viding oral or documentary evidence."0 Accord-
ingly, both dissenters rejected Stewart's attempt
to distinguish Davis v. 1lississippi3Y Marshall
stated that like Davis, illara and Dionisio involved
official investigatory seizures which interfere with
personal liberty. Rejecting Stewart's two-step
test, Marshall argued that what happens to a
witness before the grand jury is relevant in deter-
mining "what safeguards are to govern the pro-
cedures by which (the witness is) initially com-
pelled to appear."2 Marshall found the real
question before the Court to be whether a fourth
amendment exemption should be granted to grand
juries to gather physical evidence.
Marshall rejected the majority's holding that an
exception to the fourth amendment for grand jury
subpoena is warranted by the relative unobtrusive-
ness of the grand jury process. He argued that the
functional differences between an arrest or in-
vestigative "stop" and a grand jury subpoena are
inconsequential; the same type of social stigma
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) and Schmerber v.
California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), which argued that the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination is
not limited to testimonial compulsion. Justice Marshall
similarly argued that the fifth amendment privilege
prevents the government from obtaining incriminating
evidence which can only be gained with the affirmative
cooperation of the accused.
2n 410 U.S. at 22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
29 410 U.S. at 23 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 31
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
30Id. at 27 (Douglas, J., dissenting); Id. at 41
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
"1394 U.S. 721 (1969). Marshall's historical argument
is constructed from Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273
(1919), in which the Court said:
[Tihe giving of testimony and the attendance upon
court or grand jury in order to testify are public
duties which every person.., is bound to perform
upon being properly summoned....
Id. at 281 (emphasis added). Similar limiting language
appears in many other Supreme Court opinions. See,
e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Kastigar
v. United States 406 U.S. 441 (1972); Piemonte v.
United States, 36 U.S. 556 (1961); Ullmann v. United
States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956); Blackmer v. United States,
284 U.S. 421 (1932).
22410 U.S. at 42 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
and interference with personal liberty occur with
an arrest as with a grand jury subpoena. He
therefore concluded that "the fourth amendment
was placed in our Bill of Rights to protect the in-
dividual citizen from such potentially disruptive
governmental intrusion into his private life unless
conducted reasonably and with sufficient cause." 3
Marshall also disagreed with the majority's
conclusion that allowing grand juries to sub-
poena some physical evidence without a showing
of reasonableness will aid in preserving the grand
jury's traditional independence. In fact, such a
practice will lead to prosecutorial abuse of the
grand jury process. So long as the grand jury limits
its investigations to testimonial inquiries, the
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion protects against prosecutorial abuse. Since the
grand jury is so limited, its processes "would not
appear to offer law enforcement officials a sub-
stantial advantage over ordinary investigative
techniques." 14 However, when a grand jury seeks
nontestimonial evidence to which no fifth amend-
ment privilege applies, the government has the
power to subvert the grand jury process and seek
incriminating evidence otherwise unobtainable
because of Davis. Marshall concluded that the
majority's opinion "serves only to encourage
prosecutorial exploitation of the grand jury
process, at the expense of both individual liberty
and the traditional neutrality of the grand jury." 5
Justice Douglas' dissent paralleled that of
justice Marshall. Justice Douglas believed that the
majority's approach would lead to further de-
struction of the independence of the grand jury
because the government could use the grand jury
to obtain evidence it could not now obtain without
a showing of reasonableness. Douglas also attacked
the majority's interpretation of the expectation-of-
privacy test. He asserted that obtaining hand-
writing or voice exemplars required the coopera-
tion or compulsion of the individual and thus the
government does invade the individual's zone of
privacy, which makes the fourth amendment
applicable regardless of whether there is a full-
blown search.' 6
The differences between the majority's and the
minority's fourth amendment analyses are rela-
tively slight and basically factual." The dissenters
" Id. at 44.
"4 Id. at 46.
35 Id. at 47.38 Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
7Justice Marshall seems to admit as much. See
410 U.S. at 50 n.9.
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